

## Message Text

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ACTION AF-06

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 EUR-12 IO-11 ARA-06 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 AID-05 SAM-01 SAJ-01 EA-07 OMB-01

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P 231320Z FEB 76

FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7856

INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PRETORIA PRIORITY

AMCONSUL CAPE TOWN PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY MAPUTO PRIORITY

USMISSION USUN PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 YAOUNDE 0676

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFELE FROM AMBASSADOR

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

E.O.: 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, OAU, US, AO

SUBJ: FOREIGN MINISTER KEUTCHA ON ANGOLA

REFS: (A) STATE 38734 (B) STATE 41491 (C) STATE 41505

(D) YAOUNDE 263 (E) YAOUNDE 290

1. SUMMARY. IN LONG, DISCURSIVE CONVERSATION, FONMIN KEUTCHA  
PRAISED ASSISTANT SECRETARY'S STATEMENT TO SENATE SUBCOMMIT-  
TEE ON AFRICA, CALLED SECRETARY'S FAILURE TO GAIN SOVIET CON-  
CESSIONS IN MOSCOW DECISIVE FOR ANGOLAN DENOUEMENT, EXPRES-  
SED EXPECTATIONS THAT GUERRILLA WARFARE IS UNLIKELY TO CONTINUE  
IN ANGOLA AND THAT CUBAN TROOPS MIGHT BE USED

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AGAINST NAMIBIA, EXPLAINED US DIFFICULTIES WITH CURRENT AFRICAN

PROBLEMS AS RESULTING FROM AMERICAN IMPATIENT TEMPERAMENT, AND SPOKE OF AFRICAN PRIDE WHICH MAKES AID CUT-OFFS INTENDED TO INFLUENCE UN VOTES PRODUCE THE OPPOSITE RESULTS. END SUMMARY.

2. FONMIN KEUTCHA RECEIVED ME FEBRUARY 20 IN COMPANY OF DIRECTOR AFRO-ASIAN AFFAIRS ELLEIH ELLE AS NOTETAKER. IN DISCURSIVE, ANECDOTAL MOOD, HE KEPT ME FOR MORE THAN 70 MINUTES, MUCH OF WHICH HE DEVOTED TO PERSONAL AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OFFICIAL OPINIONS. AFTER I HAD MADE POINTS OF REF A, HE REPLIED TO MY INQUIRY THAT HE WOULD NOT BE GOING TO OAU COUNCIL OF MINISTERS MEETING, WHERE GURC WOULD BE REPRESENTED BY ITS AMBASSADOR TO ADDIS (REF B). (FYI: MINISTER IN PRESIDENCY SENGAT KUO, AT RESIDENCE DINNER SAME EVENING, SAID FEBRUARY COUNCIL OF MINISTERS IS SUPPOSED TO DISCUSS ONLY BUDGETARY QUESTIONS, THOUGH ANGOLA, SAHARA, DJIBOUTI MIGHT COME UP. END FYI).

3. KEUTCHA SAID THAT HE HAD READ VERY CAREFULLY ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFELER'S STATEMENT TO THE CLARK SUBCOMMITTEE AND FOUND IT EXTREMELY KNOWLEDGEABLE AND PERCEPTIVE. TO HIS QUESTION HOW THE SUBCOMMITTEE AND SENATE HAD REACTED, I REPLIED, "IN DIVIDED WAYS" AND GAVE HIM SOME BACKGROUND ON US DOMESTIC ASPECTS OF THE ISSUE. KEUTCHA THEN REFERRED BACK TO THE "GIGANTIC" EFFORTS OF CAMEROON DELEGATION TO OAU SUMMIT IN JANUARY AND TO "PROPHETIC" STATEMENT HE MADE TO ME DURING JANUARY 22 CONVERSATION (REF D AND E) ABOUT THE DECISIVE IMPORTANCE OF SECRETARY'S MOSCOW NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THE US AND USSR WERE DANCING A TANGO, AND THIS TIME AROUND THE SOVIETS OUT-DANCED THE SECRETARY BECAUSE OF THE CONGRESSIONAL HANDICAP UNDER WHICH HE WAS OPERATING.

4. KEUTCHA ASSERTED THAT GURC HAD RECOGNIZED MPLA IN ORDER TO URGE ANGOLAN RECONCILIATION UPON IT, AS PRESIDENT AHIDJO HAD DONE PUBLICLY IN HIS RECOGNITION MESSAGE TO NETO. NOW THAT THE MPLA WAS IN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY, THE FUTURE WAS A MATTER OF INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT, IN WHICH OUTSIDE COUNTRIES WOULD PLAY A DIMINISHING ROLE. HE THOUGHT ZAIRE WAS ABOUT TO MAKE ITS PEACE WITH THE MPLA, BUT CONSIDERED ZAMBIA A BIT MORE DOUBTFUL. ON THE BASIS OF HIS OWN EXPERIENCE AS A PREFECT IN THE AREA OF THE COMMUNIST-SUPPORTED INSURGENCY IN CAMEROON, KEUTCHA OPINED THAT GUERRILLA WARFARE AGAINST THE MPLA GOVERNMENT WAS UNLIKELY

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TO BE SUSTAINABLE FOR LONG OR TO SUCCEED. SINCE ANGOLA'S PROBLEMS IN FUTURE WOULD BE MAINLY THOSE OF INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT, HE ASKED WHAT US ATTITUDE WOULD BE. I REPLIED THAT I THOUGHT ADMINISTRATION, CONGRESS, AND PUBLIC WOULD BE SYMPATHETIC TO EVERHALF ASSISTANCE REQUESTS, AS IN CASE OF OTHER FORMER PORTUGUESE COLONIES, INCLUDING MOZAMBIQUE, BUT ONLY AFTER REMOVAL OF CUBAN TROOPS AND SOVIET ADVISERS. TO MY QUESTION HOW AND WHEN HE EXPECTED CUBANS' AND SOVIETS' REMOVAL TO BE EFFECTED,

KEUTCHA OFFERED STRICTLY PERSONAL VIEW THAT CUBANS WOULD BE USED IN OPERATIONS AGAINST NAMIBIA.

5. THIS LED HIM TO LENGTHY DISCOURSE ON SOUTH AFRICA AND RECEIVED US RELATIONS WITH IT. ON THE PUBLIC LEVEL, HE ACKNOWLEDGED US ABHORS APARTHEID AND SUPPORTS OAU POSITION ON NAMIBIA - AS IN RECENT UNANIMOUSLY-PASSED UN RESOLUTION. BUT JUST THE OTHER DAY, A SOUTH AFRICAN SENATOR HAD ASSERTED THAT SOUTH AFRICAN TROOPS ENTERED ANGOLA ONLY AFTER PREVIOUS APPROVAL FROM USG FOR THIS MOVE. ALTHOUGH WE HAD NOT YET RECEIVED REF C, I DENIED THIS ALLEGATION AS UNTRUE. KEUTCHA AGREED THAT IT PROBABLY WAS, BUT MADE THE POINT THAT SUCH ASSERTIONS FROM SOUTH AFRICA RAISE DOUBTS IN MINDS OF AFRICANS ABOUT SINCERITY OF US.

6. KEUTCHA CALLED PRETEXT OF PROTECTING HYDROELECTRIC DAM, UNDER WHICH SOUTH AFRICA WAS KEEPING 10,000 TROOPS IN SOUTHERN ANGOLA, COMPLETELY PHONEY AND POINTED TO CABORA BASSA DAM IN MOZAMBIQUE TO PROVE THAT IT WAS UNNECESSARY. WITH THE SOUTH AFRICAN MILITARY IN ANGOLA AND NIMIBIA, MOST OAU MEMBERS WOULD NOT ONLY NOT OPPOSE CONTINUED CUBAN TROOP PRESENCE IN ANGOLA, BUT MIGHT WELL APPROVE OF TROOPS' USE IN LIBERATION OF NAMIBIA.

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FM AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 YAOUNDE 0676

FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFELE FROM AMBASSADOR

CAPE TOWN FOR EMBASSY

7. IN COURSE OF DISCUSSION OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ADMINISTRATION AND MEMBERS OF CONGRESS OVER ANGOLA, KEUTCHA ATTRIBUTED MOST US FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEMS TO AMERICAN TEMPERAMENT, OF WHICH IMPATIENCE IS MAJOR CHARACTERISTIC. BY CONTRAST WITH THE CHINESE, WE ALWAYS WANT TO GET EVERYTHING DONE RIGHT AWAY AND IF WE CANNOT, WE PULL OUT, AS IN VIETNAM. THE CHINESE, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN AHIDJO FIRST REJECTED THEIR OVERTURES BECAUSE OF PRC SUPPORT TO THE CAMEROONIAN INSURGENCY, AND AFTER NUMEROUS OTHER FAILURES IN AFRICA, WENT HOME, THOUGHT THINGS OVER, AND THEN PATIENTLY RETURNED UNTIL THEY WERE ACCEPTED. THEIR ASSISTANCE PROJECTS ARE SIMILARLY DESIGNED BY AND FOR THE PATIENT, WITH AN EYE TO THE VERY LONG TERM.

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8. KEUTCHA MENTIONED HAVING LISTENED TO AN ARTICLE OF MINE ON US POLICY TOWARD AFRICA ON THE VOICE OF AMERICA. I REPEATED ITS THEME - THE OSCILLATION BETWEEN EXCESSIVE EXPECTATIONS OF THE NEW AFRICAN STATES AND EQUIVALLY EXCESSIVE DISILLUSIONMENT, INCLUDING CHARGES OF INGRATITUDE, WHICH I HOPED AMERICANS WERE BEGINNING TO OVERCOME. THIS LED HIM TO TELL PERSONAL ANECDOTE INTENDED TO MAKE POINT THAT NOBODY CAN BUY AFRICAN VOTES AT UN OR ELSEWHERE, BECAUSE AFRICANS ARE TOO PROUD, EVEN IF THEY HAVE TO GO HUNGRY. HE ALSO REMINISCED, FOR SECOND TIME IN MY PRESENCE, ABOUT HIS WARNING TO AMBASSADOR BUSH AT UN DURING DEBATE ON PRC SEATING. KEUTCHA TOLD BUSH THAT PRC WOULD WIN AND THAT CAMEROON, HAVING FIGURED THIS OUT CONTRARY TO US FORECAST, WOULD VOTE FOR PRC. CAMEROONIAN HONESTY MADE HIM TELL THIS BEFOREHAND. THEN, WHEN CERTAIN DELEGATIONS DANCED JIG ON FLOOR OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY, PHOTO SHOWED THREE-MEMBER GURC DELEGATION SITTING GLUMLY WITH FOLDED ARMS. KEUTCHA WAS TOLD THAT PRESIDENT NIXON HAD STUDIED THIS PHOTO AND CONCLUDED THAT CAMEROON WAS A SERIOUS COUNTRY. I ASSURED HIM THAT NO ONE HAD EVER REFERRED TO CAMEROON AS AN UNSERIOUS COUNTRY, AND THAT THE DISTINCTION, OR THE CLASSIFICATION, WAS AN IMPORTANT ONE.

9. POINT OF THESE STORIES WAS THAT CAMEROON CONSIDERED ITSELF FRIEND OF US, BUT THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT OUR INTERESTS ALWAYS COINCIDE OR THAT WE SHOULD AGREE ON ALL ISSUES. INDEED, KEUTCHA SAID, IT WOULD BE UNHEALTHY IF WE DID ALWAYS AGREE. NEITHER OF

US USED THE TERM, BUT HE WAS TALKING ISSUE-SPECIFICITY.

10. AT END OF CONVERSATION, KEUTCHA MUSED ALOUD ABOUT WORST POSSIBLE CASE, A WAR BETWEEN THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. "CAMEROON EXISTS UNDER THE SECURITY UMBRELLA OF THE US", HE SAID. IN CASE OF SUCH A WAR, HE FELT CERTAIN THAT SOVIET TROOPS WOULD OCCUPY CAMEROON, BECAUSE THE SOVIETS LOOKED UPON IT AS A FRIEND OF THE US. HIIS

MAIN UNSTATED QUESTION WAS ABOUT STEADINESS AND RELIABILITY OF US AFRICAN POLICY. (FYI: SIMILAR QUESTION WAS PUT MORE EXPLICITLY TO VISITING AMERICAN SHELL PRESIDENT-DESIGNATE BOOKOUT BY BOTH PRIME MINISTER BIYA AND MINISTER SENGAT KUO, IN CONTEXT OF CONGRESSIONAL VOTES ON ANGOLA. BOOKOUT TOLD THEM THAT HE BELIEVED CONGRESS IS NOT REPRESENTATIVE OF PEOPLE OF THIS ISSUE, AND THAT AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE WILLING TO MAKE SACRIFICES TO OPPOSE SOVIET EXPANSION IN AFRICA. END FYI).

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11. KEUTCHA AND ELLEIH ELLE MENTIONED PRESS REPORTS OF SECRETARY'S PROJECTED AFRICAN VISIT AND OPINED IT WOULD HAVE "EDUCATIVE VALUE" FOR BOTH SIDES.

12. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH DCM AT RESIDENCE DINNER FEBRUARY 20, MINISTER AT PRESIDENCY SENGAT KUO AND SAMUEL LIBOCK, KEY FOREIGN AFFAIRS STAFFER AT PRESIDENCY SECRETARIAT GENERAL, BOTH INDICATED THAT IN CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES, THEY HOPEFUL THAT GUERRILLA WARFARE WOULD NOT RPT NOT ENSUE IN ANGOLA. ALTHOUGH THEY CONSIDERED WITHDRAWAL OF CUBAN FORCES AS DESIRABLE, NEITHER THOUGHT THAT ABOUT TO HAPPEN SOON SINCE NETO STILL NEEDED CUBAN ARMY. LIBOCK, WHO CLAIMED HE HAD MET NETO A NUMBER OF TIMES, DESCRIBED HIM AS VERY STUBBORN AND UNLIKELY TO ACCEPT UNITA AND FNLA "PEOPLE" IN HIS REGIME, THOUGH HE WOULD TRY TO CONCILIATE THE POPULACE. LIBOCK ALSO MADE INTERESTING COMMENT THAT WIDESPREAD OPINION AMONG CAMEROONIAN ELITE WAS THAT ANGOLAN OUTCOME (MPLA VICTORY) WAS PERMITTED AS RESULT OF BILATERAL US-SOVIET DEAL, WITH TRADEOFF FOR US SOMEWHERE ELSE; SITUATION THUS NOT PERCEIVED AS SOVIET VICTORY OR US DEFEAT, OR SOMETHING SOVIETS COULD DO ELSEWHERE AT WILL. LIBOCK HIMSELF DID NOT SHARE THIS VIEW, BELIEVED THAT US EXECUTIVE INDEED HAD HONESTLY WANTED TO STOP IMPOSITION OF MPLA REGIME ON ANGOLA THROUGH SOVIET/CUBAN MILITARY ASSISTANCE, BUT HAD BEEN THWARTED BY CONGRESS. LIBOCK ALSO MADE POINT THAT MASSIVE SOVIET AID TO MPLA AGAINST PORTUGUESE COLONIALISM WOULD HAVE REDOUNDED TO SOVIET CREDIT IN EYES OF CAMEROONIAN ELITE; BUT MILITARY AID IN STRUGGLE AGAINST OTHER LIBERATION MOVEMENTS WAS NEITHER ADMIRE NOR APPROVED.

13. COMMENT: GURC WANTS AND DESIRES TO BE TAKEN SERIOUSLY. IT CONSIDERS ITSELF VERY MUCH ON US SIDE AND SHOWS SLIGHT SIGNS OF RESENTMENT AT OUR PAYING MORE ATTENTION AND/OR PROVIDING MORE

AID TO LESS SERIOUS, MORE ANTI-AMERICAN COUNTRIES LIKE JIG-DANCING  
TANZANIA. CAMEROONIANS LACK CONFIDENCE IN STEADINESS OF US COURSE,  
PARTLY BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND US DOMESTIC POLITICS.  
EMBASSY, THOUGH CONSISTING OF TYPICALLY IMPATIENT AMERICANS,  
WILL TRY PATIENTLY TO OVERCOME THIS.

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